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There are a number of international initiatives that have the goal 
of improving or maintaining financial stability by strengthening 
financial infrastructure. The Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS) of the central banks of the Group of Ten (G-10) 
countries is contributing to this process through its work on 
developing Core Principles for systemically important payment 
systems (Core Principles). 
 
 
At the time of this presentation, the Core Principles are not yet 
finalized. In December 1999 a consultative report was published, 
containing a set of Core Principles. At its meeting in Mexico in May, 
the CPSS approved the current draft of the Core Principles and also 
encouraged continuation of the work on Part 2 of the report, which 
explains the principles in more detail and provides guidelines for their 
implementation.1 
 
 
The principles are expressed in a deliberately general way to help 
ensure that they can be useful in all countries and that they will be 
durable. They do not represent a blueprint for the design or operation 
of any individual system, but suggest the key characteristics that all 
systemically important payment systems ("SIPS") should satisfy. 
 
 
The _CPSS established a Task Force on Payment System 
Principles and Practices in May 1998 to consider what principles 
should govern the design and operation of payment systems in all 
 
 
 
 
1 Almost 300 comments and suggestions were offered in the first consultative 
phase. In summer 2000 a revised text, taking account of the comments received was 
again made available for public comment, and the final version was published in 
January 2001 (www.bis.org/cpss). This article reflects the state of discussions at the 
time of the presentation. 
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countries? The Task Force is seeking to develop an international 
consensus on such principles. It comprises representatives not only 
from G-10 central banks and the European Central Bank, but also 
from 11 other national central banks of countries in different stages 
of economic development from all over the world and representatives 
from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 
undertaking its work it has also consulted groups of central .banks in 
Africa, the Americas, Asia, Pacific rim, and Europe. 
 
 
The CPSS and General Concern for Risk Reduction 
 
 
The CPSS is one of the permanent central bank committees 
reporting to the G-10. The G-10 Governors· established the CPSS in 
1990, as a follow-up to the work of the Committee on Interbank 
Netting Schemes, which produced the "Lamfalussy Report,"3 and 
more generally to take over and extend the activities of the earlier 
Group of Experts on Payment Systems, in 1990. 
 
 
The CPSS serves as a forum for the G-10 central banks to 
monitor and analyze developments in domestic payment, settlement, 
and clearing systems as well as in cross-border and multicurrency 
netting schemes. It also provides a means of coordinating the 
oversight functions to be assumed by the G-10 central banks with 
respect to these private netting schemes. In addition to addressing 
general concerns regarding the efficiency and stability of payment, 
clearing, settlement, and related arrangements, the CPSS pays 
attention to the relationships between payment and settlement 
arrangements, central bank payment and settlement services, and the 
major financial markets which are relevant for the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
 
 
The CPSS, under the auspices of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), has published various reports in recent years 
covering large-value funds transfer systems, securities settlement 
systems, settlement mechanisms for foreign exchange transactions, 
 
 
 
 
2 Chairman of the Task Force is Mr. John Trundle, Head, Market Infrastructure 
Division, Bank of England; see Annex 3. 
3 "Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central Banks 
of the Group of Ten Countries," BIS, November 1990. 
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clearing arrangements for exchange-traded derivatives, and electronic 
money.4 
 
 
The CPSS has long been at the forefront of efforts to reduce risks 
in payment and settlement systems. This has been motivated by 
concerns that the credit and liquidity risks inherent in payment and 
settlement systems have the potential to contribute to systemic 
problems if not properly managed and controlled. In this connection, 
the CPSS has considered it important to cooperate with other groups, 
including the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the G-
10 Deputies, to address issues of common concern. In the context of 
its activities the CPSS maintains contact with many global payment 
system providers, industry associations, and other regulatory 
authorities. 
 
 
The work of the CPSS has consistently emphasized the importance 
of large-value interbank funds transfer systems, which are used by 
banks to execute payments· among themselves for their own account 
or on behalf of customers. More recently, the CPSS has also 
embarked on a more detailed study of retail payment instruments and 
related settlement systems. Payment systems, their risk management 
arrangements, and implications for central bank policy have often 
been a focus of the CPSS discussions, and over time it has compiled 
substantial information on their main characteristics both in G-10 and 
in non-G-10 countries. This experience has laid the groundwork on 
which the new Core Principles can build. 
 
 
Why Core Principles for Payment Systems? 
 
 
Safe and efficient payment systems are critical to the effective 
functioning of the financial system. Payment systems are the means 
by which funds are transferred between banks, and the most significant 
payment systems, which the Core Principles refer to as "systemically 
important payment systems," are a major channel by which shocks 
can be transmitted across domestic and international financial systems 
and markets. Robust payment systems are, 
 
 
 
4 Most publications are available online at the website of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) at http://www.bis.org/cpss. 
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therefore, a key requirement in maintaining and promoting financial 
stability. 
 
 
As regards the Core Principles in particular, several influences are 
of relevance: international consensus for promoting internationally 
accepted standards, the objective need to reduce payment system risk, 
the request from many emerging market economies for particular 
guidance in their payment system reform process, and the existing 
body of policies and recommendations emanating from the CPSS. 
 
 
The Consensus for Promoting Internationally Accepted 
Standards 
 
 
Over the past few years, a broad international consensus has 
developed on the need to strengthen payment systems by promoting 
internationally accepted standards and practices for their design and 
operation. The consensus for promoting internationally accepted 
standards was perhaps first formulated in 1997 by the ad hoc Working 
Party on Financial Stability in its report on "Financial Stability in 
Emerging Market Economies." 5 
 
 
In response to an initiative at the Lyon summit in June 1996, 
representatives of the countries in the Group of Ten and of emerging 
market economies had jointly sought to develop a strategy for fostering 
financial stability in countries experiencing rapid economic growth and 
undergoing substantial changes in their financial systems.6 
 
 
 
5 "Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies-A strategy for the 
formulation, adoption, and implementation of sound principles and practices to 
strengthen financial systems," Report of the Working Party on Financial Stability in 
Emerging Market Economies, April1997; (www.bis.org/publ/gten02.htm). 
6  Representatives of Argentina, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States participated in the work, which was carried 
out under the chairmanship of Mario Draghi, Chairman of the Deputies of the Group 
of T en. In the course of the work, representatives of these economies consulted with 
officials from other countries in order to take account of their views on the matters 
being considered. Representatives of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and staff members of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the European Commission, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) attended 
(continued) 
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This enterprise had been prompted by the recognition that banking and 
financial crises can have serious repercussions for these economies in 
terms of heightened macroeconomic instability, reduced economic 
growth, and a less efficient allocation of savings and investment. 
 
 
The Working Party formulated a concerted international strategy 
to promote the establishment, adoption, and implementation of sound 
principles and practices needed for financial stability. The strategy has 
the following major components: 
 
 
• Development of an international consensus on the key elements of 
a sound financial and regulatory system by representatives of the 
G-10 and emerging market economies; 
 
 
• Formulation of norms, principles, and practices by international 
groupings of national authorities with relevant expertise; 
 
 
•  Experience such as the Basel Committee, the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and IOSCO; 
 
 
• Use of market discipline and market access channels to provide 
incentives for the adoption of sound supervisory systems, better 
corporate  governance, and other key elements of a robust financial 
system; and 
 
 
• Promotion by multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the regional development banks of the adoption and 
implementation of sound principles and practices. 
 
 
Financial stability requires sufficient political and social consensus 
supporting the measures needed to establish and maintain that 
stability. A financial system that is robust is less susceptible to the 
risk that a financial crisis will erupt in the wake of real economic 
disturbances and more resilient in the face of crises that do occur. 
 
 
 
 
the meetings and provided crucial input. The working party also consulted with other 
international groupings, received contributions from a number of regional development 
banks, and had the benefit of market participants' views. 
of Ten Countries, 1998. 
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Although reforms are in many cases urgent, the time required for their 
implementation will differ considerably depending on the nature of 
the reform and the need for appropriate sequencing. 
 
 
The working party thus established that the international 
community could be of assistance by developing in a consultative 
manner a corpus of sound principles and practices bearing on financial 
system robustness and supporting their adoption and implementation. 
 
 
As the existing examples of standards issued by various standard 
setting bodies show, these "high-level" recommendations by the 
Working Party on Financial Stability have resulted in a ·number of 
detailed initiatives, each geared toward plugging particular gaps in the 
global financial stability framework. 
 
Such standards, including· the Core Principles, are important as 
"the widespread adoption of high-quality internationally accepted 
standards, or codes of good practice, can make an important 
contribution to effective policymaking, well-functioning financial 
markets and a stronger international financial system."8 
 
 
The Need to Reduce Payment System Risk 
 
 
Stable and healthy payment systems are the essence of a well 
functioning market economy. The need for a well-founded body of 
principles which all countries can look to for guidance is ever more 
important, given the developments in payments and payment systems in 
particular during the past 20 years. 
 
 
Probably most important is the phenomenal growth in financial 
market activity. Estimates compiled by the CPSS indicate that these 
systems transfer the equivalent of over 6 trillion U.S. dollars per day in 
the G-10 countries,9 a large portion of which is related to the 
settlement of financial market transactions. Since financial 
 
 
 
7  See   the Financial Stability Forum's "compendium of standards" at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm ] 
8 (http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/wasi.htm) 
9 Bank for International Settlements, Statistics on Payment Systems in the Group of 
Ten Countries, 1998. 
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transactions almost invariably involve some form of payment, one 
product of this market growth has been growth in the values that have 
to be handled by payment systems-many of which were originally 
ill equipped to handle the activity. The result: a substantial increase in 
risks. 
 
 
This growth has occurred in terms of both the total number of 
individual payments and related messages as well as of the total 
amounts involved in payments. For instance: 
 
 
•  CHIPS, the New York Clearing House's net settlement system 
and, along with the European Central Bank's real-time gross 
settlement system TARGET, the system with the largest turnover, 
is a good example for the volumes settled in one single system, 
and for its cross-border impact: 87 financial institutions from 
27 countries create an average daily volume of 234,000 payments 
valued at a total of US$1.3 trillion; its peak day, so far, was 
November 28, 1997, when 457,012 payments were settled, with a 
total value of US$22,236 trillion.10 As regards TARGET, 
transnational payments within TARGET ·reached a daily average 
of350 billion euro in July 1999. 
 
 
•  Within the European Union (EU) the volume of cross-border 
payments is bound to increase as the internal market establishes 
itself and develops toward full economic and monetary union, 11 in 
particular as the European Central Bank has urged the providers 
of payment services to develop an infrastructure that allows 
payments from one EU country to another to be made as fast and 
cheaply as within any given national/domestic framework. 
 
 
•  S.W.I.F.T. was considered very successful in 1978 when it linked 
about 500 banks in 16 countries and had achieved an annual 
traffic volume of almost 25 million financial messages. Today 
S.W.I.F.T. handles the same number of messages in a few weeks, 
 
 
 
10 Nelson, "Proposed changes to CHIPS," Int 'I PaySys, London: ibc, 1999. 
11 In March 1992 the volume of retail payments below ECU 2,500 was estimated 
at 200 million transactions: "Payment systems in Europe," opening address by 
Commissioner d'Archirati at the European Finance Convention, December 3, 1993. 
In the EU, the Commission typically focuses on retail payments, whereas work on 
large-value payment systems has been undertaken by central banks. 
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and its users, who now exceed 6,500 in number, are located in 
roughly 130 countries; traffic totalled 937 million messages in 
1998.12 
 
 
Payment systems involve many risks. The prime concern here- 
i.e., from the point of view of regulation-is counterparty risk. That 
is, credit and liquidity risks arising from the interbank exposures 
which exist in many payment systems. 
 
 
More specifically, the concern is with counterparty risk where it 
is extreme enough to cause systemic risk-namely, the risk that, 
because of these interbank exposures in payment systems, the failure 
of one bank participating in a payment system will cause the failure 
of others. 
 
 
Request from Emerging Markets 
 
 
Emerging markets have themselves been requesting guidance. In 
the same measure as awareness of payment system risk increases, 
central banks worldwide have been active in reducing perceived risks. 
One tendency is certainly the increased introduction of real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS) systems.13 RTGS is particularly important, partly 
because it comes as close to eliminating payment system risk as you 
can get and partly because it is an important platform for other system 
improvements-namely, mechanisms to deal with the "exchange of 
value" risk that occurs when settling financial market transactions. 
 
 
But also netting systems have undergone constant improvements 
towards greater safety and towards reducing to a very large extent 
payment system risk. 
 
 
 
 
12 S.W.I.F_.T.- 1998 Annual Report, p. 14. As a systems operator for the private 
ECU Clearing and Settlement System, S.W.I.F.T. started in 1986 with 7 clearing 
banks and about 1,700 daily transactions (average), and terminated these services in 
December 1998 with 62 clearing banks and on average 7,308 daily transactions 
(information provided by the BIS as former Agent for the Private ECU Clearing and 
Settlement System, January 4, 1999). 
13 We are not aware of a list containing all existing RTGS systems, but we know 
of over 40 countries where RTGS systems, or systems with similar risk reduction 
effects, have been introduced or which are about to introduce such a system. 
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While the industrialized countries have led the pace in payment 
system reform, countries and institutions that are at the beginning or 
in the middle of a payment system reform process are eager ·to "do the 
right thing" and to be assured that the major investments they are 
putting forward will result in an own modem payment · system 
infrastructure that is in line with agreed international best practice and 
yet compatible with the country's particular needs. 
 
 
Making Good Use of the "Acquis" 
 
 
The CPSS and previous related groups have over the years 
developed a rich body of analysis of relevance to payment systems, 14 
the best known being probably the 1990 Report to G-10 Governors of 
the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes (the Lamfalussy Report) 15  
The report analysed issues affecting cross-border and multicurrency 
netting schemes and established minimum standards and more general 
goals for the design and operation of such schemes as well as 
principles for their cooperative oversight by central banks. 
 
 
But in the context of establishing minimum standards for relevance 
in promoting financial stability worldwide, i.e., for establishing standards 
that would address any type of system of systemic relevance, the 
Lamfalussy standards are suitable only to a degree. 
 
 
On the one hand, the Lamfalussy standards were designed for netting 
arrangements in large-value payment systems in a cross- border context 
and did not as such contemplate the new RTG developments or entirely 
national systems or, for that matter, retail payment systems. Nevertheless, 
the standards proved to be extremely useful in assessing risk reduction 
measures in payment systems and the Lamfalussy standards have been 
accepted and applied increasingly widely, not only in the specific field 
for which they were 
 
 
 
14 The past work of the CPSS and related groups has included- detailed analysis 
of payment and settlement system infrastructure in both developed and emerging 
economies. Although most of the earlier work has been analytical rather than 
prescriptive, in some areas-notably in its work on cross-border and multicurrency 
netting and on foreign exchange settlement risk- more specific guidelines and 
strategies have been developed to reduce risk, particularly systemic risk. 
15 See footnote 3. 
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developed, but also to payment, clearing, and settlement systems of 
many other types, even where they did not entirely "fit" the scope of 
the standards. The Lamfalussy standards were instrumental in 
encouraging designers, operators, and overseers of netting systems to 
consider and address risks and to achieve certain minimum standards. 
"Best practice," however, as one of the goals of the CPSS Core 
Principles, is more demanding than the minimum and an increasing 
number of systems have recognized the benefits of, for example, 
being able to withstand the failure of more than the single largest net 
debtor to the system. 
 
 
On the other hand, the Lamfalussy standards were developed 
entirely in a G-10 environment, as the only potential participants in 
multicurrency or cross-border netting systems at the time were from 
G-10 countries. Even if the Lamfalussy standards are regarded as 
convincing and serve as a guideline for many payment systems 
overseers, new standards and "core principles" for payment systems 
required a wide consultation with as many relevant parties as feasible. 
 
 
The CPSS Core Principles thus build on the existing work; they 
use to a large extent standards of the Lamfalussy Report, but they also 
extend the Lamfalussy standards in that they do not apply only to 
netting systems and in that a much wider circle than only G-10 central 
banks participated in their creation. 
 
 
Who Is the Audience? 
 
 
The Core Principles are directed both at public bodies as well as 
the private sector. On the one hand, they will be of relevance to 
system operators and designers. In many countries, the operator of a 
payment system will be the national central bank, but that is not 
necessarily the case. - Designers of payment systems will also have an 
interest in the Core Principles as they will help the designers to avoid 
certain, non-compatible design features in SIPS. 
 
 
The Core Principles are also directed at payment system 
overseers, mainly the central banks. The overseer will need to 
monitor on a regular basis the compliance of any systemically 
important payment system with the Core Principles. This applies both 
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to systems that are operated by the central bank and also to systems 
that are operated by the private sector.16 
 
 
Finally, the Core Principles are directed at participants and users 
of SIPS as they have a justified interest to know which minimum 
criteria to expect from overseers and operators of such systems. Also, 
the requirements, expectations, and expertise of participants and users 
in payment systems are an important element in the continuing 
dialogue between operators, overseers, and users that is essential for 
the success of any payment system. 
 
 
The Scope of the Core Principles 
 
 
"Systemically Important" Payment Systems 
 
 
How does a country know which of its payment systems should 
comply with the Core Principles? 
 
 
The consultative report sets out Core Principles for the design and 
operation of systemically important payment systems and defines 
·central bank responsibilities in applying these principles. It is 
noteworthy that the Core Principles do not distinguish between "large-
value" and "low-value" or "retail" payment systems as such, and 
application of the principles also does not depend on whether such 
systems involve a credit or debit mechanism and whether they 
operate electronically or involve paper-based instruments. Rather, the 
new term "systemically important" refers to systems that could trigger 
or transmit systemic disruptions in the financial area because of the 
size or nature of individual payments that they handle or because of 
the aggregate value of the payments processed. In practice the 
boundary between payment systems that are systemically important 
and those that are not will not always be clear-cut and the central 
bank will need to consider carefully where that boundary should be 
drawn. 
 
 
It should be noted that it is well possible that a given country may 
not have a systemically important payment system. But even for 
 
 
 
 
16 See Annex I, "Responsibilities of the Central Bank in Applying the Core 
Principles." 
 702 • CPSS Core Principles for Payment Systems 
 
 
payment systems that are not "systemically important," the principles 
may also be useful in assessing and understanding the characteristics 
of systems which pose relatively little systemic risk and it may be 
desirable for such systems to comply with some or all of the 
principles. 
 
 
Universal Coverage 
 
 
The Core Principles are not a set of rules that are addressed only 
to developed countries nor only to certain regions of the world. 
Rather, they are geared toward SIPS in all countries. At the same 
time, the principles do not propagate a certain type of system, nor do 
they propagate a given system of a particular country, as being the 
one model other countries should follow. 
 
 
They are thus a general framework giving payment system 
overseers and other relevant institutions a guideline, and some 
minimum standards, for the design, operation, and oversight of 
payment systems. 
 
 
Not Addressed to Securities Systems 
 
 
The focus of the Core Principles is on payment systems, that is, 
systems that provide for the transfer of funds. The most direct 
application is for systems which involve ·only funds transfers, but the 
principles can also apply to the payments aspects of systemically 
important systems in which transfers of other financial assets, such as 
securities, and related transfers of funds are both settled. Such systems 
can raise financial stability issues in their own right, so the report 
states that it is important too that their overall" design and 
operation should be safe and efficient. 
 
 
The Core Principles may also provide some help in evaluating the 
arrangements for settling other types of financial assets, such as 
securities settlement systems, but a full consideration lies outside the 
scope of the Core Principles report. 
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Rather, CPSS and IOSCO have embarked on a project to examine 
the specific issues involved in securities settlement and to draft 
recommendations for such systems.17 
 
 
The Requirement of a Well-Founded Legal Basis 
 
 
As mentioned above, the Core Principles retain the essential elements 
of the Lamfalussy principles, as they are of relevance to SIPS. 
 
In particular Principle I, "The system should have a well- founded 
legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions," is identical to Principle I, 
taken from the Lamfalussy Report.18 
 
 
When looking at the Core Principles, one will notice that not only 
Principle I has legal implications. In fact, a number of principles have 
legal implications and will require particular attention when 
implemented in national environment.: 
 
 
• Well-founded legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions (I). 
 
 
•  Clear rules and procedures on the system's impact on financial risks 
incurred through participation (II). 
 
 
•  Clear rules and procedures on management of credit risks and liquidity 
risks (III). 
 
 
• Prompt final settlement on the day of value (IV). 
 
 
• High degree of security and operational reliability (VII). 
 
 
 
17 The objective of this project is to promote the implementation by securities 
settlement systems of measures that can reduce risks, increase efficiency, and provide 
adequate safeguards for investors by developing recommendations for the design, 
operation, and oversight of such systems. The recommendations will cover both 
individual systems and the cross-border linkages between systems. To this end, the 
two committees have set up a joint task force on securities settlement systems, 
comprising about 20 central banks and securities regulators, in addition to the co- 
chairmen, from both industrialized and emerging market economies. A first 
international consultative meeting with more than 50 public institutions was held at 
the BIS on January 19, 2000. 
18 See Annex II. 
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• Access criteria (IX). 
 
 
• Governance (X). 
 
 
The legal basis for a payment system is critical to its overall 
soundness. The term "legal basis" as such does not mean · that a 
specific law is required that will address payment system issues or, in 
the context of the Core Principles, systemically important payment 
systems. 
 
 
The foremost goal of a sound legal basis is to achieve 
predictability for all parties that participate in a given system. The 
parties therefore need to know their obligations and liabilities to a 
degree that they can reasonably predict the outcome of a regular 
transaction, and also the risks they incur in the event of a disruption 
of the system itself or of a failure of another participant in the system. 
Since most risk management systems ultimately must make 
assumptions about the rights and obligations of parties to payment 
transactions, the analysis of risk management systems almost always 
leads back to questions about the soundness of legal assumptions. 
 
 
The "legal basis" typically consists of framework legislation as 
well as specific laws, regulations, and agreements governing payments 
and the operation of the system, and of course any binding court 
decisions that need to be taken into account. Framework legislation 
will be legislation that is of relevance to payment systems, even if not 
specifically addresses payment systems. Examples of framework 
legislation include public law rules that cannot be altered by 
agreement (e.g., insolvency law, public law of banking, or in some 
cases also competition and consumer protection laws), or general 
legislation whose rules may apply in the absence of particular 
agreements between the parties to a contract. Specific laws governing 
the central bank, payments including electronic payments, payment 
finality, payment netting, and related topics are especially relevant. In 
addition, laws from countries other than the host country may be 
relevant to the robustness of the system, where their effects can be 
identified. 
 
 
The drafters of the Core Principles were well aware of the legal 
complexities and of the differences in the various national legal 
frameworks. Although sound legal underpinnings are very important, 
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absolute legal certainty is seldom achievable. Recognition of this fact, 
however, should not deter payment system operators, participants, 
and authorities from seeking to establish a sound legal basis for 
payment systems. 
 
 
In this context, a number of important elements of the '.'legal 
basis" can be identified. 
 
 
(a) Finality: It is particularly important to establish the timing of 
final settlement of payments made through the system in order to 
define when key financial risks are transferred in a payment system 
and to provide an important building block for risk management 
systems. 
 
 
(b) Insolvency law: Insolvency law is very relevant, as system 
designers and relevant authorities must ask themselves what would 
happen if a participant in the system were to become insolvent. 
Would transactions be honored as final, or could they be considered 
void or voidable by liquidators and relevant authorities? In some 
countries, for example, so-called "zero-hour rules"19 may cause 
payments not to be final even if they appear to have been settled in a 
payment system (even in a real-time gross settlement system) prior to 
the insolvency of a participant on the day of value. 
 
 
Furthermore, insolvency statutes may not yet recognize the netted 
value of payments or related obligations as binding on the liquidator 
in the event of insolvency. For example, it can be relevant to consider 
whether a liquidator might be able to successfully challenge the 
netted value of payments in a payment system involving net 
settlement. In such cases, it is not safe to rely on netted amounts for 
credit or liquidity risk management purposes. 
 
 
 
 
19 When applied in the context of a payment system, "zero-hour rules" make all 
transactions by the bankrupt participant null from the start ("zero hour") of the day of 
the bankruptcy (or similar event). In the case of a system with deferred net settlement, 
such a clause could cause the netting of all transactions to be unwound. This would 
entail a recalculation of all net positions and could cause significant changes to 
participants' balances, with possible systemic consequences. In a real-time gross 
settlement system, the effect could be to reverse payments regarding the bankrupt 
participant that have apparently already been settled and were thought to be  
final. 
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In particular, following the analysis undertaken for the 
Lamfalussy Report, a number of countries have therefore undertaken 
programs of legal change years to strengthen greatly the legal 
underpinnings of netting and to remove the risk of adverse effects 
from "zero-hour rules," particularly on systemically important 
payment systems.20 
 
 
(c) Collateral and rights in rem: The law of secured interests 
(whereby, for example, collateral can be accepted · as security for 
lending)21 may also be highly relevant to the design of risk 
management systems for payment systems. For example, many central 
banks provide credit to participants in a payment system subject to 
some type of collateralization agreement. Many privately operated 
netting systems adopt collateralization mechanisms to back up 
lending facilities to help ensure settlement in the event of initial 
failures to settle. The law of secured interests is typically the 
foundation of the collateralization or security agreement, and must be 
scrutinized carefully to ensure that a security agreement will be 
enforceable in a timely manner as envisaged. 
 
 
(d) Technological neutrality: As a general principle, it is desirable 
for laws not to differ in their effect according to the type or level of 
technology used in a payment system. Where electronic processing is 
 
 
20 See, for instance, the EU Settlement Finality Directive, which obliges EU 
countries to remove "zero-hour rules" and to uphold certain netting and collateral 
arrangements also in the event of the insolvency of payment system participants: 
Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 19, 1998 
on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems- Official Journal 
L 166. 11/06/1998 p. 0045-0050; Devos, "Specific cross-border problems regarding 
bank insolvencies and European harmonization efforts," in Giovanoli/Heinrich (ed.), 
International Bank Insolvencies: A central bank perspective, London: Kluwerlaw 
.International, 1999, pp. 311-36. On the issues in general, see, for instance, Giovanoli, 
"Legal issues regarding payment and netting systems," in: Cross-border electronic 
banking-Challenges and opportunities, (ed. by J. Norton); London: Lloyd's of 
London, 1995, pp. 205-31; Le Guen, "Netting and legal protection for interbank 
settlement systems," Banque de France Bulletin Digest, No.I0, Oct. 1994, pp. 33-44. 
21 A collateral transaction is typically subject to three main bodies of law: the 
law of secured interests, insolvency law, and contract law. The main areas of concern 
are the conditions under which a pledge or repo will be valid and also the procedures 
that have to be followed if the transferor defaults and the collateral has to be realized 
by the transferee. However, the most likely reason for a default by the transferor is 
insolvency, and thus the realization of the collateral is also likely to be directly 
affected by the relevant insolvency law. 
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involved, or whether the underlying instruments the system handles 
are electronic or paper-based, it will be necessary to ensure that the 
relevant law (particularly where it is not very modem) is compatible 
with the methods used. New legislation might indeed be needed to 
achieve clarity and predictability of interpretation if the existing legal 
system is too restrictive and/or does not allow for the parties to agree 
on relevant issues by contract.22 
 
 
(e) Public law of banking: Banking and central banking laws can 
play an important role. Banks and central banks may need authority in 
law to establish and participate in payment systems and to design 
effective and well-managed systems, including adopting sound risk 
management principles.23 
 
 
(f) Foreign law: Laws from outside the domestic jurisdiction can be 
relevant where there is a cross-border element to the system. At one 
extreme this is particularly the case where a system provides a cross-
border service. The laws of the participants' home jurisdictions are likely 
to be relevant, as well as .the laws of the jurisdiction under which the 
system operates. Many laws are potentially relevant, but of particular 
importance will be insolvency  laws in the different jurisdictions. It may 
be relevant to consider whether, in the event of a foreign participant's 
insolvency, the insolvency procedure in the foreign country will have a -
direct effect in the country where the payment system is located or 
whether the foreign liquidator might be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce/Loi type sur le com- 
merce electronique, June 14, 1996,  (www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ ml-
ec.htm). Also, even though not directly applicable to payment systems as such, the 
standard contractual arrangements contained in the S.W.I.F.T. handbook or the 
model standard contract between two or more trading partners developed by the 
United Nations and the European Union, respectively, may . be of interest: United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECE), Model Interchange Agreement for the 
International Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange, of September 20, 
1995, ECE Recommendation No. 26, adopted by the Working Party on Fa- 
cilitation of International Trade Procedure in March 1995, UN DOC. 
TRADE/WP.4/R.l133/Rev.l, June 23, 1995; Bertrand, "EDI-The final draft of the 
European Interchange Agreement," Int'l Computer Law Adviser 5 (1991) 4-15. 
23 See Banca d'ltalia, White paper on payment system oversight: Objectives, 
methods, areas of interest, Rome, November 1999. 
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able successfully to challenge the netted value of payments in a 
national payment system.24 
 
 
Furthermore, foreign law may need to be considered when 
evaluating the validity of any collateral agreement in a cross-border 
context. 
 
 
There have been a number of regional and international 
initiatives to reduce the risks of legal uncertainties or conflict. These 
include various European Union directives, such as the Settlement 
Finality Directive,25 aimed in particular at setting legal certainty for 
operations with the TARGET system, the United States' Uniform 
Commercial Code26 (on which the New York Commercial Code is 
based and which is of relevance for the CHIPS system) and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.27 
 
 
 
 
 
24 See Giovanoli/Heinrich (ed.), International Bank Insolvencies: A central bank 
perspective, London: Kluwerlaw International, 1999. 
25 Supra footnote 20. 
26 The New York Commercial Code follows- in its articles relevant to 
payment systems-Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code. The relevant 
section in the New York State Uniform Commercial Code Article 4-A [N.Y. U.C.C. § 
4-A-403(2)], practically identical in every U.S. state, reads: "Section 4-A-403. 
Payment by Sender to Receiving Bank. (1) ....; ·(2) If the sender and receiving bank 
are members of a funds-transfer system that nets obligations multilaterally among 
participants, the receiving bank receives final settlement when settlement is 
complete in accordance with the rules of the system. The obligation of the sender 
to pay the amount of a payment order transmitted through the funds-transfer system 
may be satisfied, to the extent permitted by the rules of the system, by setting off 
and applying against the sender's obligation the right of the sender to receive payment 
from the receiving bank of the amount of any other payment order transmitted to the 
sender by the receiving bank through the funds-transfer system. The aggregate 
balance of obligations owed by each sender to each receiving bank in the funds-
transfer system may be satisfied, to the extent permitted by the rules of the system, by 
setting off and applying against that balance the aggregate balance of obligations 
owed to the sender by other members of the system. The aggregate balance is 
determined after the right of setoff stated in the second sentence of this subsection 
has been exercised" (http://assembly. state.ny.us/cgi-bin/claws?law=122&art=38). 
Also note the general deference within the law to funds transfer system rules 
contained in Article 4-A-501: Section 4-A-501. Variation by Agreement and Effect of 
Funds- Transfer System Rule (http://assembly.state.ny.us/cgi-
bin/claws?law=122&art=39). 
27 Although not geared at specific issues related to payment systems. See 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency/Loi-type sur l'insolvabilité 
transnationale, of May 30, 1997; UNCITRAL, Official Records of the General 
(continued) · 
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As regards the law for security interests in goods, an international 
convention unifying substantive rules governing security interests 
appears does not appear to be feasible, in particular in view of the 
wide divergences existing among legal systems and the complexity of 
the issues involved in secured credit law; however, a number of 
international bodies are working at harmonizing applicable rules-
at least for certain types of commercial transactions.28 
 
 
What Are the New Principles? 
 
 
Principle IV, requiring at least same-day settlement, 
preferably intraday: 
 
 
The system should provide prompt final settlement on the day of 
value, preferably during the day and at a minimum at the end of the 
day. 
 
 
This principle is one of two that stipulates a minimum standard, 
i.e., it establishes a measurable threshold that a given system will 
either achieve or not achieve. 
 
 
Principle IV relates to daily settlement in normal circumstances. 
Between the time when payments are accepted for settlement by the 
payment system (including satisfaction of any relevant risk management 
tests, such as the application of limits on exposures or availability of 
liquidity) and the time when final settlement actually occurs, 
participants may still face credit and liquidity risks. These risks are 
exacerbated if they extend overnight, in part because a likely time for the 
relevant authorities to close insolvent institutions is between business 
days. Prompt final settlement helps to reduce these 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/52/17, annex I) (UNCITRAL 
Yearbook, vol. XXVIII: 1997, part three); Idem, Guide to Enactment of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency" (A/CN.9/442). The Model Law 
and Guide to Enactment are also available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf; Sekolec, "The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,'' in Giovanoli/Heinrich, supra 
footnote 24. 
28 For an overview of initiatives at both government and nongovernment·level, 
see United Nations/UNCITRAL, "Security interests-Current activities and possible 
future work. Report of the Secretary-General," Doc. A/CN.9/475, April 27, 2000. 
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risks. As a minimum standard, final settlement should occur at the 
end of the day of value. 
 
 
The Core Principles do not recommend a particular type of 
system that would fulfill this minimum standard, and in particular, 
they do not explicitly recommend the introduction of RTGS systems, 
as the desired goal may be achieved by several different system 
designs that are not necessarily "RTGS." 
 
 
Nevertheless, the Core Principles report emphasizes that in most 
countries it should be a goal for at least one payment system to 
exceed this minimum standard by providing real-time final settlement 
during the day.29   This is particularly desirable in countries with large 
volumes of high-value payments and sophisticated financial markets. 
 
 
Principle VI, calling for safe settlement assets, preferably claims 
on a central bank or otherwise assets that pose little or no credit 
risk: 
 
Assets used for settlement should preferably be a claim on the 
central bank; where other assets are used, they should carry little or 
no credit risk. 
 
 
Most systems involve the transfer of an asset among system 
participants to settle payment obligations. Most systemically 
important payment systems settle across the books of a central bank, 
as the most common and preferable form of a settlement an asset is an 
account balance at the central bank, representing a claim on the 
central bank.30 In contrast, settlement via an account at a commercial 
financial institution always involves the credit and liquidity risk 
re.lating to the solvency of that institution.31 When that central bank is 
the central bank of issue for the currency used by the payment system, 
 
 
 
29 Core principles report, at Principle IV, 2. 
30 See Giovanoli, "Bargeld-Buchgeld-Zentralbankgeld: Einheit oder Vielfalt im 
Geldbegriff?," in: Banken und Bankrecht im Wandel (Festschrift Beat Kleiner), 
Zurich: Schulthess, 1993, 87-123 (121). 
31 Credit risk: the risk that a party within the system will be unable to fully meet 
its financial obligations within the system currently or at any time in the future. 
Liquidity risk: the risk that a party within the system will have insufficient funds to 
meet financial obligations within the system as and when expected, although it may 
be able to do so at some time in the future. 
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there is no credit risk for the payment system participant holding that 
balance, and the liquidity risk to the system and its participants is also 
virtually nonexistent. Such central bank balances are therefore the most 
satisfactory settlement assets. 
 
 
There are, however, examples of other forms of settlement asset, 
representing claims on other supervised institutions, as exemplified in 
the account with a commercial bank. If settlement is completed using 
such assets, the Core Principles require that the assets must pose little or 
no credit risk. The Task Force's latest thinking is that account should also 
be taken of whether such an asset involves significant liquidity risk. 
 
 
As all participants in the system must accept the asset, the system's 
safety depends in part on whether the asset leaves the holder with 
significant credit risk. If there were more than a negligible risk that 
the issuer of the asset could fail, the system could face a crisis of 
confidence, which would create systemic risk. 
 
 
Principle VII, stipulating that a SIPS needs to be practical for 
users, efficient for the economy: 
 
The system should provide a means of making payments which is 
practical for its users and efficient for the economy. 
 
 
Operators, users (that is participants, such as banks and their 
customers), and overseers of systems all have an interest in the efficiency 
of a system. "Efficiency" is a however a very commonly used term-not 
just in payment systems. In the context of payment systems, the term 
relates to achieving an acceptable level of safety and service at the 
minimum cost. There will typically be a trade-off between minimizing 
resource costs and other objectives, such as maximizing safety. It may be 
conceivable to design a system that is absolutely risk free in a given 
environment, but the cost may be so high that noone uses it. This may be 
an issue in any environment where several payment systems compete 
with each other or where a system design that was suitable for one 
country was introduced into another without taking account of the 
country's specific factors such as geography, its population distribution, 
and its infrastructure. 
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The costs of providing payment services will depend on the 
quality of service and the features demanded by users, and on the- 
need for the system to meet the Core Principles limiting risk in the 
system. A system which is consistent with the demands of the 
markets it serves is likely to be more heavily used and so will spread 
more widely the risk-reducing benefits of satisfying the other 
principles and the costs of providing the services. 
 
 
But a given system that is efficient today may not be so 
tomorrow. Systems should therefore be designed and operated so that 
they can adapt to the development of the market for payment services 
both domestically and internationally. Their technical, business, and 
governance arrangements should be sufficiently flexible to respond 
to changing demands, for example, in adopting new technologies 
and procedures. 
 
 
The report discusses these concepts in more detail, and sets out an 
analytical framework for system design. This should encompass: 
 
 
• the identification of efficiency requirements; 
 
 
• the evaluation of costs (social and private, including not only 
those that are passed on to participants directly through system 
charges but also indirect costs, such as cost of liquidity and 
collateral); 
 
 
•  the determination of technological and infrastructure constraints 
(e.g., telecommunications, energy availability, transportation, and 
banking structure); and 
 
 
• the definition of the safety constraints imposed by the core 
principles. 
 
 
Principle X, requiring effective, accountable, and transparent 
governance arrangements: 
 
 
The system's governance arrangements should be effective, 
accountable, and transparent. 
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Payment system governance arrangements32 encompass the set of 
relationships between the payment system's management and its 
governing body (such as a board of directors), its owners, and its 
other stakeholders. These arrangements provide the structure through 
which the system's overall objectives are set, how they are attained, 
and how performance is monitored. 
 
 
Effective governance provides proper incentives for management 
to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the system, its 
participants, and the public more generally. It also ensures that 
management has the appropriate tools and abilities to achieve the 
system's objectives. Governance arrangements should provide 
accountability to owners (for example, to the shareholders of a private 
sector system) and, because of the system's systemic importance, to 
the wider financial community, so that those served by the payment 
system can influence its overall objectives and performance. 
 
 
An essential aspect of achieving accountability is to ensure that 
governance arrangements are transparent, so that all affected parties 
have access to information about decisions affecting the system and 
how they are taken.33 
 
 
Because systemically important payment systems have the 
potential to affect the wider financial and economic community, there 
is a particular need for effective, accountable, and transparent 
governance, whether the system is owned and operated by the central 
bank or by the private sector. And good governance provides the 
foundation for compliance with the Core Principles as a whole. 
 
 
Principles A-D, spelling out the responsibilities of central 
banks in applying the core principles: 
 
 
Different aspects of the safety and efficiency objectives for SIPS 
may be pursued by a variety of different public sector agencies. 
Central banks have a leading role, particularly because of their strong 
 
 
 
32 For banking institutions, see, for instance, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Enhancing corporate governance in banking organisations, BIS, 
September 1999 (www.bis.org/publ/bcbs56.htm). 
33 See IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial 
Policies, September 26, 1999 (www.irnf.org/extemallnp/mae/mft/codelindex.htm). 
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interest in financial stability, their role in providing settlement 
accounts for payment system participants, and their concerns with 
the functioning of money markets for the implementation of 
monetary policy and with maintaining confidence in the domestic 
currency both in normal circumstances and in a crisis. The expertise 
they have developed through carrying out these functions means that 
central banks have a leading role to play in respect of SIPS. In many 
cases they have been given explicit responsibilities in this area, e.g., 
in central bank legislation, or their role is part of an undisputed 
tradition. Most central banks now recognize the oversight of 
systemically important payment systems as a core function, 
contributing to financial stability and complementing the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
 
 
The four central bank responsibilities in applying the Core 
Principles to SIPS34 stem from this leading role. A distinction is 
drawn (in Responsibilities B and C) between those systemically 
important payment systems which are operated by the central bank 
and those which are not. The central bank has different 
responsibilities in these two cases but, in both cases the central 
bank's objectives are safety and efficiency and the obligation to see 
that the Core Principles are applied. 
 
 
Implementation 
 
 
Finally, the question arises how the Core Principles should be 
implemented, and who will enforce implementation.   
As an international standard of best practices, the Core Principles 
are intended to be applied. They are part of the "Compendium of 
Standards" compiled the by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).35 
 
 
 
 
· 34 See Annex I. 
35 This compendium provides a common reference for the various economic and 
financial standards that are internationally accepted as relevant to sound, stable, and 
well-functioning financial systems. As the compendium is posted on the FSF's 
website (http://www.fsforum.org), it serves as a gateway or point of entry for 
financial authorities and market participants to access the sites where the complete 
standards, supporting documents, and assessment methodologies referenced in the 
standards are located. The compendium aims to signal the importance attached by 
the international community to the implementation of these standards and sound 
(continued) 
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However, there is no absolute "recipe" how a country should go 
forward in applying the principles, nor is there an absolute method 
how the international community will see to it that the Core Principles 
are respected. 
 
 
As any document or recommendation produced under the auspices 
of the BIS, the Core Principles do not have the power of law; at best 
they are "soft law."36 As the BIS and the CPSS have no regulatory 
powers, any guidance has to be of high quality in order to be relevant. 
The Core Principles-like other work of the CPSS-have to be 
relevant and useful in helping designers, operators, and overseers of 
payment systems decide what to do. 
 
 
However, other international financial institutions like the IMF 
and the World Bank can and do encourage, within their mandate, 
adoption and implementation of such guidance as part of the assistance 
they provide. 
 
 
This shows two facets of implementation of the Core Principles: 
the "pull" and the "push" method. In the first instance, the countries 
that will apply the principles will want to do so entirely on their own 
motivation, because they find the principles convincing and because 
they want to be part of the international consensus that was achieved. 
In the second instance, implementation may be seen as occurring 
through "pushing," as the World Bank and the I.M.F will use the 
principles in financial sector assessments or in technical assistance 
programs aiding those institutions that wish to bring their systemically 
important payment systems to the level recommended in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
practices; and facilitate the dissemination of information on them. An FSF document 
listing ongoing and recent work relevant to sound financial systems is available at 
http://www.fsforum.org/Reports/RepORW.html.  At an FSAP follow-up meeting held 
in spring 2001, the IMF and World Bank also recognize the Core Principles as being 
one of 11 key standard areas, together with the CPSS/IOSCO recommendations for 
Securities Settlement Systems (Consultative Report, January 2001, 
http://www.bis.org/cpss). 
36 See Giovanoli, "A new architecture for the global financial market: Legal 
aspects of international financial standard setting," in: Mario Giovanoli (ed), 
International Monetary Law-Issues for the New Millennium, Oxford, 2000, pp. 3-60. 
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the Core Principles and call on these institutions for guidance and 
assistance. 
 
 
For instance, IMF staff, in conjunction with the relevant 
authorities of the respective countries, has embarked on a series of 
experimental "Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes" 
(ROSC).37 These reports summarize the extent to which countries 
observe certain internationally recognized standards, focusing 
primarily on the areas of direct operational concern to the IMF.38 
 
 
In practice, the "pull" and "push" approaches will need to be 
distinguished, even though they will necessarily influence each 
other. In the context of the international community's desire to 
strengthen financial stability, the Core Principles are one of many 
existing standards. Therefore, a prioritization of standards will be 
necessary, and such prioritization will necessarily vary from 
economy to economy, taking into consideration their current legal 
and institutional framework, their status in observance of standards, 
economic circumstances, financial structures, and policy priorities. 
As concerns the Core Principles, a balance would also need to be 
struck between national and domestic considerations, which could be 
achieved through national authorities working closely with the 
international financial institutions (such as the BIS, the IMF, or the 
World Bank) and standard-setting bodies, such as the CPSS. 
 
 
In the context of a particular country's--or central bank's desire to 
implement the Core Principles, this can of course be accomplished 
independently of the other international standards that are not related 
to payment and settlement systems. Also in such event it should be 
recalled that the Core Principles do not propagate any particular 
model. In particular Principle VIII comes into play here as it 
specifically mentions that a system should be "practical for its users 
 
 
37 At their inaugural meeting in Berlin on December 16, 1999, the Group of 
Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors agreed to undertake the 
completion of the "Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes" (ROSC) and of 
the "Financial Sector Assessments" (FASP)-both elaborated jointly by the IMF and 
the World Bank- within the context of continuing these efforts. Similarly, Western 
Hemisphere Finance Ministers have encouraged their members to participate in 
FSAPs and have agreed to participate in ROSCs.   · 
38 Access to country reports and general information on ROSCs is available at 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/rosc/index.htm. 
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and efficient for the economy." In some countries this will require 
thorough analysis of the needs, possibilities, and also limitations of the 
payment system participants and the economy as a whole, and may 
also require the building of particular payment system expertise. 
 
 
In this, cooperation is of essence. Cooperation does not mean 
copying what the neighbor has done, and it also does not mean 
following blindly the advice of experts and consultants. In 
implementing the Core Principles, a multifaceted approach is desirable, 
lie in any major project. 
 
 
In some central banks, specialized offices or teams have taken on 
the task of bringing forward a country's payment system reform 
project.39 In others, those responsible for payment system oversight 
have been grouped into a special division in the central bank, separate 
from the department that is responsible for the operations, or even, a 
special authority may be created, with certain own regulatory powers 
and an own annual report.40 
 
 
Within the institution, or among institutions, it is important that 
all relevant experts, economic analysts, technicians, and lawyers 
cooperate from the outset of a project. As experience has often shown, 
it would be a mistake to bring in lawyers only at the end of a project, 
shortly before planned implementation of a new system; likewise it 
would be a mistake if only technicians, accountants, and information 
technology experts worked together without consulting the 
economists on issues such as the cost of collateral, expected 
participation, pricing, etc. This may require that the lawyers gain 
more knowledge of the concerns of payment system experts. And, as 
Principle I of the Core Principles shows, the payment systems experts 
need to be aware of the importance of legal issues and need to be 
aware of the solutions that the lawyers can find in order to achieve a 
"well-founded legal basis" .  On a national level, it will be beneficial 
that the authorities that are taking the lead in a payment system 
reform project-most likely the central bank-engage from the outset 
in a dialogue with the anticipated users of the systems-the banking 
 
 
39 E.g., at the central banks of Peru and Brazil, at the BCEAO in Dakar, or at 
Bank Indonesia (National Payment System Development Bureau). 
40 E.g., for Australia Payment Systems Board, Annual Report, Sydney: Reserve 
Bank of Australia, 1999. 
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community. Again, we know from anecdotal evidence that 
this is not always the case. 
 
 
Conclusion: The Need for Continued Cooperation 
 
 
Finally, on an international level, it is important that payment 
system experts work together. The Core Principles are after all a good 
example for such cooperation. It is important that payment system 
experts in the central banks know all the arguments, concerns, and 
solutions to concerns that the colleagues have found. After all, 
payment system overseers need to convince: they have hardly any 
regulatory or executory powers, as opposed to bank supervisors, and 
any good argument can help in their task. Some central banks that 
have identified a common goal or where there are common regional 
interests have created more or less formal groups of experts, like the 
CPSS, or the Group of Payment System Experts of the EMEAP 
(Executives' Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks) 
countries, or the group of payment system experts from the central 
banks/monetary authorities of the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC).41 
 
 
Where no formal arrangement exists, experts may meet in special 
events, such as workshops or roundtables organized, for instance by 
the CPSS in cooperation with local or regional institutions, or by the 
IMF and the World Bank (and the current event is a very good 
example of an· expert meeting-for lawyers--organized by the IMF). 
Also the contribution of private or commercial initiatives42 and of 
more nationally oriented assistance and training programs,43 to the 
discussion and dissemination of payment system expertise should not 
be neglected. 
 
 
 
41 Similar central bank initiatives are under way for some Eastern European 
countries that have applied for accession to the European Union, and for countries of 
the Black Sea Group. In addition, regional political cooperation may include 
cooperation in the payment systems area, e.g., the PSSC (Payment and Settlement 
Systems Committee) within the ESCB, between the ECB and the candidates for 
accession to the EU, among central banks of the South African Development 
Community (SADC), or among the member countries of the Western African 
Monetary Union .and the BCEAO as their central bank. 
42 E.g., commercial seminars and workshops, S.W.I.F.T.'s annual SIBOS event, 
etc.  
43 E.g., the U.S. "Financial Services Volunteer Corps," or programs organized 
by individual central banks. 
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I personally hope that the good cooperation between CPSS, IMF, 
and the World Bank, as shown in the elaboration of the CPSS Core 
Principles, will continue also when the principles are finalized and 
have become part of a living body of internationally accepted 
standards. 
 
 
Annex 1: The Core Principles and 
Central Bank Responsibilities 
 
 
Public Policy Objectives: Safety and Efficiency 
in Systemically Important Payment Systems 
 
 
Core Principles for systemically important payment systems 
 
 
The system should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant 
jurisdictions.44 
 
 
The system's rules and procedures should enable participants to have 
a .clear understanding of the system's impact on each of the 
financial risks they incur through participation in it. 
 
 
The system should have clearly defined procedures for the 
management of credit tasks and liquidity risks, which specify 
the respective responsibilities of the system operator and the 
participants and which provide appropriate incentives to 
manage and contain those risks. 
 
 
*The system should provide prompt final settlement on the day of 
value, preferably during the day and at a minimum at the end 
of the day. 
 
 
*A system in which multilateral netting takes place should, at a 
minimum, be capable of ensuring the timely completion of 
daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle by the 
participant with the largest single settlement obligation. 
 
 
Assets used for settlement should preferably be a claim on the central 
 
 
44 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Bank for International 
Settlements, Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, Report of 
the Task Force on Payment System Principles and Practices. 
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bank; where other assets are used, they should carry little or 
no credit risk. 
 
 
The system should ensure a high degree of security and operational 
reliability and should have contingency arrangements for 
timely completion of daily processing. 
 
 
The system should provide a means of making payments that is 
practical for its users and efficient for the economy. 
 
 
The system should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for 
participation, which permit fair and open access. 
 
 
The system's governance arrangements should be effective, 
accountable and transparent. 
 
* Systems should seek to exceed the minima included in 
these two principles. 
 
 
Responsibilities of the central bank in applying the Core 
Principles 
 
 
The central bank should define clearly its payment system objectives 
and should disclose publicly its role and major policies with 
respect to systemically important payment systems. 
 
 
The central bank should ensure that the systems it operates comply 
with the Core Principles. 
 
 
The central bank should oversee compliance with the Core Principles 
by systems it does not operate and it should have the ability 
to carry out this oversight. 
 
 
The central bank, in promoting payment system safety and efficiency 
through the Core Principles, should cooperate with other 
central banks and with any other relevant domestic or foreign 
authorities. 
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Annex 2: The "Lamfalussy Standards" 
The Lamfalussy standards relating to netting schemes45 are: 
Netting schemes should have a well-founded legal basis under all 
relevant jurisdictions. · 
 
 
Netting scheme participants should have a clear understanding of the 
impact of the particular scheme on each of the financial risks 
affected by the netting process. 
 
 
Multilateral netting systems should have clearly defined procedures 
for the management of credit risks and liquidity risks which 
specify the respective responsibilities of the netting provider 
and the participants. These procedures should also ensure that 
all parties have both the incentives and the capabilities to 
manage and contain each of the risks they bear and that limits 
are placed on the maximum level of credit exposure that can be 
produced by each participant. 
 
 
Multilateral netting systems should, at a minimum, be capable of 
ensuring the timely completion of daily settlements in the event 
of an inability to settle by the participant with the largest net-
debit position. 
 
 
Multilateral netting systems should have objective and publicly 
disclosed criteria for admission which permit fair and open 
access. 
 
 
All netting systems should ensure the operational reliability of 
technical systems and the availability of backup facilities 
capable of completing daily processing requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Supra footnote 3. 
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Annex 3: Members of the Task Force on Payment System 
Principles and Practices 
 
 
Chairman: John Trundle (Bank of England) 
Reserve Bank of Australia 
National Bank of Belgium 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Bank of Canada 
European Central Bank 
Banque de France 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
National Bank of Hungary 
Banca d'Italia 
Bank of Japan 
Bank Negara Malaysia 
Banco de Mexico 
Nederlandsche Bank 
Central Bank of Russian Federation 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
Monetary Authority of Singapore 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
South African Reserve Bank 
Sveriges Riksbank 
Bank of England 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Central Bank of West Africa (BCEAO) 
International Monetary Fund 
World Bank 
Bank for International Settlements (Secretariat)
  
